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Abstract: The discrete logarithm in a finite group of large order has been widely applied in public key 
cryptosystem. In this paper, we will present a probabilistic algorithm for discrete logarithm. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The generalized Discrete Logarithm problem (GDLP) has been taken as an intractable problem 
widely applied in public key cryptosystems since it firstly was proposed by W. Diffie and M.E. 
Hellman in their key exchange system [1]. The problem is the one to find the solution for the 
exponential equation xa b= in a groupG . Since then, there have been several algorithms for 
GDLP presented, in which main three ones are that, the baby-step giant-step algorithm, Silver- 
Pohlig- Hellman’s algorithm and the index calculus algorithm. Suppose that the order ofG  
| |G N= , then the required operations of the first algorithm will take about ( )O N group 
multiplications and ( log )O N N⋅ comparisons. The second one is similar to the method of 
solving the congruence in number theory by resolve the equation into the subgroups of groupG  
with the order of prime powers, so it is more efficient if the prime factors of group G  all are 
smaller. In the case the base groups G  are from the multiplication groups of finite fields, the 
index calculus is the most powerful one. For the detail about GDLP, refer to see [2] and A.M. 
Odlyzko’s survey papers [3], [4]. 
In this paper, we will present a probabilistic algorithm for discrete logarithm, which is a 
development of the birthday attack.  
As usual, for two integers x and r , we will represent  [ ] ( 1) ( 1),rx x x x r= ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − +"   and 
[ ] ( 1) ( 1).rx x x x r= ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + −"  Let A be a set of t elements, in which elements repetitions are 
allowed, suppose that there are just t d− different elements in A , then we call A  has 
d collisions.  
 
2. The description and analysis 
 
Suppose that G is the base group of discrete logarithm, the order ofG , | |G N= , and g G∈  
is a generator of G . Let { |1 }ixiS y g i m= = ≤ ≤ be a set of m public keys. Denoted by 
1/ 2 1n N⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥ , for each ,1 ,iy S i m∈ ≤ ≤  arbitrary takes n  distinct integers ( ) ,1ijr j n≤ ≤ ,  
and makes a set  
( )
{ |1 },1 .
i
jr
i iS y j n i m= ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  
Moreover, arbitrary takes n  distinct integers (0) ,1jr j n≤ ≤ , and makes a set 
( )
0 { |1 }.
i
jrS g j n= ≤ ≤  
 
Proposition 1 Let
0
i
i m
S
≤ ≤
Ω = ∪ , suppose that k is a non-negative integer, k m≤ , denoted by 
( )kp Ω (or simply, kp ) the probability that there are at least k collisions in the setΩ , it has 
2( 1) 21 ( 1) / !.m kkp e m k
ε− + +≥ − ⋅ +                       (2.1) 
where 3 22( ) / 3 .T k Nε −≺  
Proof.  Let | | ( 1)T m n= Ω = + , for each integer , 0 ,i i m≤ < denoted by iλ  the number of all 
possible -subsetsT of N distinct elements with i collisions, then it is easy to know that 
1[ ] / ! ,
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Hence, 
2 3 2
1
0 0
2
01
2
1
2
2
2
1
( 1) 2( ) /3 2
1 /([ ] / !) 1 [ ] [ ] /[ ]
21 (1 ) ( 1) / !
)
21 exp( )( 1) / !
2 21 exp( )( 1) / !
1 ( 1) / !.
T i T
k i T i i T
i k i k
i
i ki T k
k
i T k
k
i T k
m T k N k
p N T N T C N
i m i
N i
i m k
N i
i i m k
N N
e m k
λ − −
≤ < ≤ <
≤ <≤ < −
≤ < −
≤ < −
− + + −
≥ − ≥ − ⋅ ⋅
≥ − − ⋅ ++
−≥ − ++
−≥ − + +
≥ − ⋅ +
∑ ∑
∑∏
∑
∑
 
  
 
From the proposition above, we know that the probability ( )mp Ω will be greater than 0.99  as 
2m ≥ . 
Clearly, a collision in the set Ω  is just a linear equation of the privacy keys 1{ }mix , say in detail, 
if , 0i j ≠  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) mod ,
i j
s tr r i j
i j s i t jy y r x r x N= ⇔ ⋅ = ⋅  
and 
( ) (0) ( ) (0) mod .
i
s tr r i
i j s i ty y r x r N= ⇔ ⋅ =  
So, in the case that these m linear equations are linear independent, then all the privacy 
keys 1{ }
m
ix will be discovered by solving the obtained linear system.  
On the other hand, we know the probability that randomly take m  m -vectors which are linear 
independent is very great, which is about 1 (1/ )N− . 
It is clear that the main computations required in this new analysis are the comparisons to find 
m collisions in the setΩ  and the group multiplications in making the sets iS . By the simple way 
that classifying the elements of Ω  in bits one by one, the required comparisons to order the 
elements inΩ are about ( log )O T T , which is about equal to the required comparisons in the 
baby-step giant-step algorithm. If properly selecting the constants ( )ijr , the amount of group 
multiplications required in the new algorithm also will be about equal to the one of the baby-step 
giant-step algorithm. However, in the case that m is greater, we can reduce the size n of the sets 
iS  into 
1/ 22 1
1
Nn
m
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
, then we have the following estimation 
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              (2.2) 
So, in this way, the required group multiplications in the presented algorithm will be less than the 
ones in the baby-step giant-step algorithm. 
Finally, similar to Silver- Pohlig- Hellman’s algorithm, we can resolve the original GDLP into the 
subgroups of the cyclic group generated by element g , and then apply this analysis above to the 
subgroups. 
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